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1 “I am sick of politics [siyaset]!” Hatice1 exclaimed with a sense of exasperation as we
were trying to warm up over tea after the performance she had given together with a
number of other women dengbêjs [Kurdish bards] at the occasion of the International
Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women on the 25 November, 2012. The rally
had  been  organized  by  the  Democratic  Free  Women’s  Movement  [Demokratik  Özgür
Kadın Hareketi, DÖKH], the PKK-aligned wing of the Kurdish women’s movement, and
the seemingly never-ending speeches by various women politicians had not only made
the cold seep into our bodies but also cut into the dengbêjs’ performance time. Angry
over having been cut short at a rally yet another time Hatice exclaimed with a mixture
of passion and frustration: “I want to do art [sanat], not politics [siyaset]!” She felt that
Kurdish culture and arts – paradigmatically embodied, in her view, by dengbêjs like
herself – had lost out not only against the upbeat tempo of popular pieces like Aynur
Doğan’s “Keça Kurdan” that had been pounding out from the large loudspeakers during
the  rally,  but  also  against the  professional  politicians  of  the  Kurdish  Peace  and
Democracy Party (BDP)2 and their speeches. But wasn’t being a dengbêj and thereby
preserving Kurdish traditions in itself a measure supporting the Kurdish cause, Hatice
now asked us. Were they not supporting the aims of the Kurdish women’s movement,
as women dengbêjs out there on a stage in the freezing cold? Why then were they not
given the attention she felt they deserved? Turning to me, Münevver, a great admirer
of dengbêjs and their kilams3 with a passion for Kurdish literature and poetry, felt the
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need to explain. It is a general problem of the Kurds as a people that they don’t know
how to keep things separate,  she told me, and seemed to imply that this failure at
proper separation was somehow responsible for the historical predicament of Kurdish
subaltern  status  and  possibly  even  for  the  Kurdish  failure  at  establishing  an
independent  nation-state.  “Politics,  militarism,  music,  art,  culture;  they  should  be
separate from each other,” she said, “but we Kurds, we constantly mix them up!” 
2 Taking Hatice’s rejection of politics in the name of art and Münevver’s simultaneous
insistence on boundary maintenance as my points of departure, in what follows I seek
to  investigate  some  of  the  complexities  and  paradoxes  of  contemporary  Kurdish
heritage production in Turkey through the prism of dengbêjî. As this article will argue,
Hatice’s  exasperation  at  the  continual  encroachment  of  politics  upon  the  art  of
dengbêjî has to be understood as an effect of the particular ways in which dengbêjî has
become codified  as  cultural  heritage  and  thus  as  the  authentic  essence  of  Kurdish
culture.  Such  an  understanding,  in  turn,  allows  for  a  continual  slippage  between
cultural heritage understood as, on the one hand, marking the essence of the Kurdish
nation and being therefore of an inherently political nature and, on the other hand,
constituting  a  non-  or  prepolitical  realm  of  folkloric  engagement  with  ethnic
traditions.  Following Banu Karaca (2009),  I  suggest  that  it  is  precisely  this  slippage
which lends the concept of cultural heritage its particular political productiveness and
which may therefore account for the ways in which dengbêjî has become the central
object of a number of heated debates and contestations.
3 By marshalling ethnographic material from my fieldwork with women dengbêjs in the
region  of  Van who advocate  dengbêjî as  a  form of  cultural  practice  separate  from
politics, I do not mean to suggest that these women were in any way representative of
all dengbêjs, of all Kurdish women in general or of all Kurdish cultural activists. This
was in fact hardly the case: more often than not, women like Hatice or Münevver find
themselves in a minority position within a context where everyday life  – including
cultural  and  artistic  production  –  is  intensely  and  consciously  politicized.  Given  a
longstanding and engrained history of systematic and violent persecution, repression,
denial and assimilation of all matters Kurdish by the Turkish state, Kurdishness has
effectively been rendered an inherently and inescapably political subject position in
Turkey today.  Moreover,  the  Kurdish political  movement  in  its  struggle  to  counter
state  repression  and  denial,  has  in  its  own  turn  insisted  that  Kurdishness  is  a
thoroughly political state of existence. As a result, the terrain on which any cultural or
artistic production takes place in Turkish Kurdistan has become so thoroughly suffused
with politics that invoking cultural heritage here as a sphere that ought to be free from
politics requires, as this article will proceed to show, a certain amount of social labour.
This is not to say that the kind of cultural activism advocated by women like Hatice and
Münevver is in any way apolitical; rather, their engagement may be regarded as a form
of  “nongovernmental  politics”  as  developed  by  Michael  Feher.  Feher  describes
nongovernmental politics as a form of politics that explicitly does not aspire to govern
and  which  derives  its  legitimacy  precisely  from  this  abstinence,  thus  making  for
nongovernmental actors’ frequent downplaying or denial of the political character of
their endeavours. Such claims, writes Feher, do however not enable nongovernmental
activists “to eschew the conflicts and transcend the power relations that make up the
social fabric in which they intervene” and therefore make their engagement “no more
apolitical than governmental” (Feher 2007: 13).  Referring specifically to the Turkish
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context,  Jeremy Walton has argued that  here the kind of  nongovernmental  politics
described by Feher “is not a fait accompli but an achievement” (Walton 2013: 184) given
Turkey’s  strong  state  tradition.  Taking  up  Walton’s  suggestion,  in  what  follows  I
therefore seek to explore how rendering the politics of culture nongovernmental in
Turkish Kurdistan equally constitutes an achievement that has to labour against not
only the Turkish state but oftentimes also against the Kurdish political movement.
4 A word of caution is necessary here. Given that the Turkish state has, over the last
several decades, increasingly turned to a particular form of liberal multiculturalism in
an attempt at managing its “Kurdish question” (alongside its other ethnic and religious
“minorities”), invoking Kurdish cultural heritage as a sphere free from politics plays
with the ambiguous risk of replicating – even if unintentionally – the state’s agenda of
rendering Kurdish culture a matter of depoliticized folklore. By attending to the ways
in which some of my interlocutors sought to straddle this fraught political and cultural
landscape and paying close attention to the different registers of politics they evoked
in order to do so, this article seeks to outline the fault lines that characterize attempts
at codifying and institutionalizing a stable field of Kurdish cultural heritage in Turkey
today.  Moreover,  the  article  will  also  highlight  some  of  the  specifically  gendered
dynamics  involved  in  this  undertaking  and  ask  what  opportunities  a  liberal
imagination of dengbêjî as the exercise of authentic Kurdish culture free from politics
may hold for women dengbêjs in particular. 
5 But let me begin with a brief account of the ways in which dengbêjî has come to be
conceptualized as the paradigmatic form of Kurdish cultural heritage and how such a
conceptualization lends it a particular form of political productivity. 
 
I. The authentic essence of Kurdishness: Dengbêjî as
cultural heritage
6 The idea that dengbêjî constitutes the essence of authentic Kurdish culture and that
dengbêjs are consequently its main transmitters is relatively recent. The term dengbêjî
itself is indicative of the social labour that had to go into turning this disparate field of
persons, practices and knowledge into a delimited sphere of culture, a coherent and
defined  entity  that  could  then  become  the  object  of  any  conversation,  debate  or
argument.  As  Clémence  Scalbert-Yücel  has  noted,  in  Kurdish  the  term  dengbêjî4
“sounds a bit artificial” (Scalbert-Yücel 2009: 14). Why should this be the case? Even
though I  have not been able to determine with any exactitude when the term first
entered  into  widespread  use  in  either  written  or  oral  Kurmanji  Kurdish,  my  own
observations  as  well  as  those  of  other  researchers  indicate  that  the  term  has  a
relatively  recent  history,  which  seems  to  have  evolved  in  response  to  a  need  to
designate the object it denotes – “minstrelsy,” “singing” or “the art of being a dengbêj,”
as defined by Michael Chyet (2003) – as this has come into being as a delineated object.
While the noun dengbêj, designating the singer or storyteller as a person, is a long-
established term,5 the widespread use of the related dengbêjî as a noun denoting in
abstract  fashion  the  body  of  knowledge,  as  well  as  the  practice  that  makes  one  a
dengbêj,  seems to be a relatively recent phenomenon. Today, the term dengbêjî (or
dengbejlik in  Turkish)  appears  quite  commonly in  written publications  and is  used
frequently  in  spoken  discourse  by  academics,  intellectuals,  and  many  dengbêjs
themselves,  especially  those  who  have  been  in  contact  with  Kurdish  cultural
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institutions. Throughout my fieldwork I found that the term was much less commonly
used, however, by many of the illiterate and elderly women living in the countryside,
who would more often employ constructions with dengbêj as the grammatical subject
(e.g.  “dengbêjs do…”  or  “ dengbêjs say…”)  rather  than  speaking  abstractly  about
dengbêjî as a body of knowledge (as implied by constructions like “dengbêjî is…” or “I
do dengbêjî”).6 I interpret this shift in language as indicative of the coming-into-being
of an abstract and disembodied understanding of what a dengbêj does as an identifiable
object of knowledge-cum-practice, something that one can conceive of separately from
the dengbêj as the practitioner herself. This shift, moreover, appears symptomatic of
broader changes in the understanding of Kurdish “culture” as a delineated field distinct
from the ordinary practices of everyday life.
7 Attempts at delineating, codifying and documenting Kurdish culture as a distinct field
can  be  traced  back  to  the  beginnings  of modern  Kurdish  nationalism  in  the  early
twentieth century, when Kurdish intellectuals self-consciously sought to create a canon
of Kurdish language, folklore and traditions – the kind of culture, in other words, which
constitutes the key for entry into modern nation- (and state-) hood. While intellectuals
initially  chose  to  focus  their  attention  on  the  “high  culture”  of  written  Kurdish
literature,  especially  in  the  period  following  the  First  World  War  attention  shifted
towards oral and folk culture – including dengbêjs’ kilams and tales – as the main source
for  what  was  understood  to  constitute  Kurdish  cultural  heritage  (Strohmeier  2003:
151-154). Among the most important efforts at documenting this heritage-to-be were
those undertaken by Celadet Bedirkhan, who published – in close scholarly exchange
with French Orientalists like Thomas Bois and Roger Lescot – orally collected stories,
fairy  tales,  riddles  and  songs  in  his  journal  Hawar in  Damascus  during  the  1930s
(Fuccaro 2003: 206-209). This early emphasis on the significance of orally transmitted
literature  secured  the  figure  of  the  dengbêj  a  central  place  within  an  evolving
understanding of Kurdish culture, although not yet in the paradigmatic fashion that
has characterized the tradition’s more recent revival. 
8 With the often violent  suppression of  any Kurdish cultural  and intellectual  activity
beginning  in  the  last  years  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and  taking  on  intensified  and
systematic shape under the Kemalist regime of the Turkish Republic, it took until the
latter half of the twentieth century for a revival of Kurdish cultural activities to take
place, now in the framework of Kurdish nationalism that had been developing since the
1960s. This Kurdish political activism, as it emerged from Turkey’s Left with a distinct
socialist character, entailed a focus on the culture of “the people” and consequently a
rather sceptical attitude towards dengbêjs, who were considered symbols of Kurdish
society’s  feudal  structure  and  hence  of  a  backwards  past  that  Kurds  needed  to
overcome. While some voices within the Kurdish movement did advocate the collection
of  oral  traditions  and  the  revival  of  folklore  as  a  means  to  construct  a  corpus  of
national culture, the dominant ideological position was that Kurdish national culture
needed to be comprised of revolutionary cultural forms, which would reflect the heroic
national struggle for liberation, and not of dengbêjs’ epics and legends that smacked of
feudalism and fairy-tale romances (Scalbert-Yücel 2009). This attitude was confirmed to
me  by  many  of  my  female  interlocutors,  who  recalled  that  activists  and  Kurdish
institutions had initially not shown any interest in the “old songs” [kilamên kevn] that
these women knew, and that Kurdish music production, broadcasting and performance
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used  to  be  dominated  instead  by  popular  music  with  political  lyrics  glorifying  the
Kurdish struggle (Aksoy 2006; Blum and Hassanpour 1996).
9 Beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s this situation started to change as the result
of several factors. One important element was the ideological reorientation of the PKK
and the Kurdish movement more broadly after the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999,
which entailed a distancing from Marxist-Leninist ideology, the official abandoning of
the struggle as one directed towards the establishment of an independent nation state,
and the embracement of a politics of identity focusing on the attainment of cultural
and linguistic rights for Kurds in Turkey (Akkaya and Jongerden 2013). This shift in the
political arena coincided with a renewed interest in dengbêjî by Kurdish writers and
intellectuals,  many  of  whom  live  and  work  in  the  European  diaspora,  and  the
publication of several fiction and non-fiction works about dengbêjî and/or individual
dengbêjs.7 Central to the change in perception of dengbêjî has moreover been the role
of  institutions,  most  importantly  the  Kurdish  municipalities  and  Kurdish  cultural
institutions like the Mesopotamia Cultural Centres [Navenda Çanda Mezopotamya, NÇM],
which have since the early 2000s increasingly promoted dengbêjî through festivals and
concerts,  the  opening  of  so-called  Dengbêj  Houses  [Malên  Dengbêjan]  and  other
institutionalized cultural activities (Scalbert-Yücel 2009; Watts 2010: 148).
10 Today,  only  a  small  number  of  cultural  centres  in  Turkish  Kurdistan  are  in  their
entirety dedicated to dengbêjs.8 Nevertheless, in most towns established NÇMs have a
section, if  only a separate room or corner,  allocated to dengbêjs’  performances (so-
called diwans). These tend to be decorated with cushions and hand woven carpets, oil
lamps, water pipes and other “authentic” village objects that are considered indicative
of Kurdish tradition. Dengbêjî has also experienced a revival on Kurdish television, with
video clips of dengbêjs – usually shot against the backdrop of iconic landscapes taken to
signify  Kurdishness,  such  as  highland  pastures,  remote  villages  or  high  mountain
passes  –  being  broadcasted  frequently  on  the  various  music  channels.  Live
performances of larger groups of dengbêjs,  in turn, fill  entire evening programmes.
Dengbêjî recordings also make up a sizable proportion of the professionally distributed
Kurdish music in Turkey and of the music that circulates outside the realm of copyright
law, judging from the ubiquitous acoustic presence of dengbêjs’ voices in both public
and private spaces, emanating from cars and shops and resounding inside homes and
work places (cf. Reigle 2013). 
11 The dominant narrative about dengbêjî depicts the dengbêj as one or even the  most
important  representative  of  Kurdish  culture,  thanks  to  whom  Kurdish  language,
culture  and  history  have  been  saved  from  extinction  despite  decades  of  state
suppression  (Scalbert-Yücel  2009).  Famous  dengbêjs like  Evdalê  Zeynikê  are  often
described  as  the  Homer  of  the  Kurds,  and  their  stories  characterized  as  Kurdish
versions of the Epic of Gilgamesh. Dengbêjs are venerated as the oral historians of the
Kurdish people, as the carriers of Kurdish collective memory and the transmitters of
oral literature.9 This discourse effectively posits dengbêjs not just as one, albeit central,
element of  Kurdish culture,  but as  what has allowed Kurdish culture as a  whole to
survive to the present day. In this way, dengbêjî is held to constitute an essential link
between a Kurdish present and its past, a link that ought to be extended in order to
harness a Kurdish national future (Kanakis 2013). 
12 And it is this imagination of continuity, also, combined with the notion of authenticity
that qualifies dengbêjî as a form of cultural heritage.  Indeed, in conversations with
Being sick of politics: The production of dengbêjî as Kurdish cultural herita...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 20 | 2015
5
dengbêjs and other cultural actors or in popular publications on the topic the terms k
ültür [culture] and miras [heritage, inheritance] are often used interchangeably, with
both terms all too often accompanied by the attribute otantik [authentic] (cf. Kanakis
2013). Here then, we can see how a cultural practice – cultural in this instance evoking
the sense of processual, “lived” culture – turns into heritage through a process of what
Nathalie Heinich has felicitously termed “the administration of authenticity” (Heinich
2009: 261). As Heinich notes, such “authentic” heritage operates according to a logic of
inscription: because heritage is held to provide continuity between past and present, its
object requires some sort of fixation (Heinich 2009: 24). The emergence of dengbêjî as
an abstract noun is only one effect of such fixation; others include, for example, the
evolving  notion  of  “original”  as  opposed  to  “faulty”  kilams and  the  slow  (though
nonetheless contested) standardization of a canon of recognized dengbêjs, repertoires
and styles. Another effect is that dengbêjî has come to be virtually an umbrella term
used in order to describe almost all Kurdish performers of sung poetry and prose. While
the term dengbêj used to be local to the region of Serhat, 10 increasingly performers
from other regions who are often locally known under terms such as stranbêj [singer] or
şair [poet]  have  appeared  under  the  label  “ dengbêj”  when  addressing  supra-local
audiences through Kurdish media outlets or their record covers (Çakır 2011: 52-53).
Dengbêjî, in its function as virtually the most important instantiation of Kurdish culture
– itself modelled on a paradigm of heritage – has thus come to bear the promise of
bestowing  the  authority  of  authenticity  while  at  the  same time allowing  for  ready
recognisability amongst broad audiences. 
 
II. Negotiating Kurdish cultural heritage: Between
political and depoliticized culture
13 This construal of dengbêjî as cultural heritage and thus as a delimited and relatively
fixed entity has allowed for dengbêjî to turn into an object of debate whose relations to
politics may be envisioned in radically different ways. Before I go on to explore some of
these  different  positions  in  more  detail,  let  me  briefly  note  how  the  particular
conceptualization of dengbêjî as cultural heritage that I have outlined here is crucially
linked to liberal forms of governance. Understood as the primordial attribute of an
authentic ethnic community moving through the continuous and linear time of the
nation, cultural heritage and “culture” more broadly crucially contributes to qualifying
the community in question for liberal forms of representation and recognition. Within
liberalism,  the  notion of  cultural  heritage  thus  hinges  on what  Jeremy Walton has
termed a “primordialist logic of identity in relation to civil society and political action”
(Walton 2013: 190). What Walton expresses here is the idea that in a liberal framework
identity, because it is imagined as natural and authentic, is construed as essentially
prepolitical.  Nevertheless,  it  simultaneously  constitutes  a  crucial  criterion  for
communities to be able to claim rights of recognition within the political arena of the
modern nation state. Walton moreover identifies such an understanding of identity as
integral to a “romantic,” idealized imagination of civil society as a sphere distinct from
political society and (corrupting) state power. As I want to suggest, Hatice’s rejection of
politics indicates a similar “romance of civil society” as that described by Walton in
relation to Islamic civil  society institutions in Turkey.  But in order to advance this
argument further it  is  necessary to spell  out in some more detail  how other actors
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within the political and cultural landscape at stake here – chiefly the Turkish state and
the Kurdish movement – have envisioned the relation between cultural heritage and
politics in different ways. 
14 To  begin  with,  for  the  Kurdish  movement  dengbêjî  represents  an  inherently  and
inescapably political practice. The premise here is that cultural heritage is by definition
political since it marks the pristine and authentic identity of an ethnic community that
by  virtue  of  being  endowed  with  such  an  identity  is  able  to  claim  political
representation and recognition, be it in the form of self-determination, autonomy, or
even nationhood. This is the understanding of cultural heritage that Dacia Viejo-Rose,
Yudhishtir Raj Isar and Helmut K. Anheier point to when they note: 
Today,  having  a  heritage  is  indispensable  to  having  an  identity  and  cultural
memory; losing a heritage is like losing a key bit of both. Heritage has come to be
used as ‘proof’ of past, tradition, belonging, and therefore proof also of rights to
place, representation and political voice. (Viejo-Rose et al. 2011: 9)11
15 Take,  for  example,  the  following  remark  by  Esra,  a  young university  student  from
Tatvan with close ties to Kurdish political organizations, which poignantly brings to the
fore precisely such an understanding: 
[Dengbêjî’s] political aspect is immense because it is my essence [asıl]… The fact that
it is in Kurdish is already politics. That it speaks of Kurdish history is another kind
of politics. […] That we lay claim to it [sahip çıkmamız], that we are Kurdish adds yet
another meaning to it. 
16 For  Esra  dengbêjî,  because it  constitutes  the  essence  of  Kurdishness,  is  a  political
matter by definition. What accounts for this inevitable link between Kurdishness and
the  political  is  of  course  the  fact  that  any  expressions  of  Kurdishness  have  been
brutally  and systematically  suppressed by the Turkish state  throughout most  of  its
history. Esra’s remark is thus placed on a terrain that has been decisively structured by
the Turkish state, a terrain that is marked by the decade-long ban on the production
and circulation of Kurdish music and by a continuing surveillance of Kurdish musical
and cultural activity, regularly leading to convictions of musicians, including dengbêjs,
as well as other cultural figures on charges of supporting terrorism.12 By continually
reading any cultural expression that makes reference to Kurdishness as a marker of
political difference and subsequently criminalizing it, the state has thus effectively put
in place the very conditions under which attempts at Kurdish heritage-making are able
to take place. Note, however, that this criminalization of Kurdish cultural activity on
the part  of  the state is  equally  based on an understanding of  culture as  the prime
marker of primordial ethnic difference – a difference, which the state fears is readily
translatable  into  political  difference.  Both  the  Turkish  state’s  and  the  Kurdish
movement’s  cultural  policies  are  thus  driven  by  a  common understanding  of  what
culture constitutes – primordial and collective ethnic identity – and how this makes for
its privileged relation to politics.
17 More recently however – and arguably coinciding with the rise to power of the Islamist
Justice and Development Party (AKP) – observers have noted a turn of Turkish state
politics away from its Kemalist insistence on national homogeneity towards a peculiar
form of (neo)liberal multiculturalism. Of specific significance in this regard has been
the AKP’s so-called “democratic opening” [demokratik açılım] launched in 2009, which
has entailed the (often highly selective and partial) recognition of a number of rights
held by Turkey’s ethnic and religious “minorities” as well as a more general rhetoric of
cultural and religious pluralism (cf. Casier et al. 2013). With regards to dengbêjî, the
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new pluralist rhetoric in the wake of the “Kurdish opening” [Kürt açılımı] in particular
has  manifested  itself  in  a  veritable  embrace  of  the  practice  by  the  state  as  a
demonstration of its newly found tolerant stance towards its largest ethnic “minority,”
the Kurds. Thus, over recent years, state authorities and AKP-run municipalities have,
for  example,  organized  numerous  public  performances  featuring  dengbêjs while
dengbêjî performances have also become a central element of programmes aired on
TRT Kurdî (formerly TRT6), Turkey’s state TV channel broadcasting in Kurdish that was
established as part of the “Kurdish opening.” 
18 Yet,  as  critics  of  liberal  multiculturalism have repeatedly noticed,  tolerance is  here
extended  only  on  the  condition  that  the  object  to  be  tolerated  remains  within
boundaries  determined  by  the  tolerant  majority  itself  (Ahmed  2000;  Brown  2009;
Povinelli 2002). In contemporary Turkey, the boundaries that define such a domain of
tolerability  revolve,  as  Banu  Karaca  has  noted,  around  what  “can  be  construed  as
threatening the territorial integrity, and thus the sovereignty, of the Turkish state” 
(Karaca  2011:  156).  This  preoccupation  with  national  integrity  has  a  long-standing
historical  legacy  in  Turkish  political  culture  and  is  frequently  dubbed  the  “Sèvres
Syndrome.”13 Nevertheless,  the particular limits of what is deemed tolerable remain
“unclearly mapped” writes Karaca (2011: 158) and in this way allow for arbitrary state
sanctioning of any cultural or artistic practice as soon as the latter is perceived to be
threatening to Turkish state sovereignty.  As Casier,  Jongerden and Walker argue in
their discussion of the AKP’s “Kurdish opening,” this is a mode of politics that belies a
security-focused  approach  to  the  Kurdish  question  which  ultimately  results  in
narrowing the political arena for pro-Kurdish politics rather than opening it up (Casier 
et  al. 2013:  160 ).  The  ambiguity  surrounding  what  public  expressions  are  deemed
intolerable by the Turkish state that Karaca points to also accounts for the fact that
dengbêjs are  regularly  invited  to  Turkish  state  television  and  their  performances
heralded as an indication of the state’s turn to ethnic and cultural tolerance, while they
simultaneously continue to be legally persecuted for singing about their experiences of
political  violence.14 The  limits  of  the  speakable  –  and  hence  the  point  where  the
performance of cultural heritage turns from a depoliticized display of folklore into a
political statement in support of separatist terrorism in the eyes of state authorities –
thus clearly run, with regards to the Kurdish community, alongside a history of state-
sponsored violence. 
19 What I would like to emphasize, however, is that the state’s turn to the enactment of
depoliticized displays  of  “minority” cultural  heritage in  crucial  ways hinges  on the
same basic understanding of culture as does the notion of culture’s inherent political
nature: in both cases culture (or cultural heritage) is understood as the prime marker
of authenticity and ethnic difference. In case of the former, however, such difference is
construed as an ultimately private one, therefore rendering it immune from the realm
of  political  contestation  and,  in  its  supposed  naturalness,  also  immune from being
questioned as to the historical, economic and political conditions of its construction
(Stolcke  1995;  Wright  1998),  which  in  turn  allows  for  the  kind  of  commercial  and
touristic heritage display critiqued by numerous analysts (e.g. AlSayyad 2001; Herzfeld
1991; Öncü 2007). 
20 One consequence of the move towards liberal multiculturalist forms of governance on
the part of the Turkish state has been that maintaining the sense of Kurdish cultural
heritage as an inherently political category constitutes an ongoing struggle waged on
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the  part  of  the  Kurdish  movement,  putting  constant  pressure  on  all  actors  in  the
purview of the movement to display and prove their political allegiance to the latter.
This has led to a fierce policing of political community boundaries, with accusations of
treason  being  not  uncommon (Gurbuz  2012).  Artists  who  “collaborate”  with  state
institutions like TRT Kurdî, for example, are frequently sanctioned from performing at
events  organized  by  Kurdish  cultural  institutions  and  often  have  their  video  clips
removed from party-aligned TV channels.15 
21 Yet  the  radical  political  stance  of  the  Kurdish  movement  has  not  remained
uncompromised either. No matter their political affiliation, given the virtual absence of
state funding for explicitly Kurdish arts and culture in Turkey, Kurdish cultural actors
are  pressed  hard  to  conform  to  the  bureaucratic  structures of  potential  sponsors
(mainly the EU and other Western European institutions) and the normative models
these entail. As Karaca (2010) has shown, due to this general dependency on external
funding,  the  promotion  of  liberal  multiculturalist  agendas  with  their  depoliticized
visions  of  culture  on  the  part  of  both  governmental  EU  agencies  and  European
nongovernmental organizations exerts profound influence on Turkey’s cultural sector.
This equally holds true for Turkish Kurdistan where the situation is only exacerbated
by the chronic underinvestment on the part of the central state. The resulting large-
scale reliance on European funding has led to a situation where BDP-led (today HDP)
municipalities  and  other  Kurdish  civil  society  institutions  often  –  even  if  perhaps
unintentionally  –  perpetuate  the  normative  language  of  liberal  multiculturalism
promoted by  funding bodies  like  the  EU,  which frame Kurdish culture  mainly  as  a
matter of the exercise of minority rights.  One effect of this kind of framing is that
Kurdish cultural production comes to be read as a marker of ethnic group identity (that
is,  as Kurdish “culture”) only, consequently foreclosing any possibility of evaluating
such production as art (as a form of individual expression) (Karaca 2010; Kosnick 2007).
Indeed, the frequent slippage between the terms art [huner, sanat] and culture [çand, k
ültür] in reference to dengbêjî which one can frequently observe in both written and
spoken discourse by Kurdish cultural actors, including Hatice’s remark in the opening
vignette,  is  indicative  of  this  tendency  to  regard  dengbêjî  primarily  as  a  collective
ethnic marker. Such a reading, in turn, is readily facilitated by the concept of cultural
heritage and simultaneously chimes with the Kurdish struggle for recognition within a
liberal system of governance. Moreover, the brand of multiculturalism promoted by the
Turkish state through vehicles like TRT Kurdî equally performs this reading of dengbêjî
as a marker of ethnic difference – a difference construed here as neither politically nor
artistically consequential. 
22 Nevertheless,  despite  (or  perhaps  rather  because  of)  the  increasing  prevalence  of
liberal  multiculturalist discourses  in  Turkish  Kurdistan  due  both  to  policies  by  the
Turkish  state  and  by  European  funding  bodies,  the  landscape  of  Kurdish  cultural
production remains highly politicized. It is against this complex backdrop, then, that
we have to understand Hatice’s rejection of politics in favour of a supposedly pristine
sphere of arts and culture. Her rejection did not mean, however, that Hatice gave up on
politics altogether; rather, the romanticized idea of arts and culture free from politics
she evinced entailed an equally romanticized ideal of politics as a sphere of voluntary,
moral commitment. 
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III. Romances of civil and political society
23 Not long after  the DÖKH rally  on 25 November,  I  found myself  party to  a  car  ride
together with Hatice, Cemal, a male dengbêj, and Selahattin, who introduced himself as
a poet [helbestvan] and welatparêz,16 that is, a supporter of the Kurdish armed struggle.
During our journey along the coast of Lake Van, a conversation between Hatice and the
two men – whom she knew only through distant  common acquaintances –  ensued.
Hatice promptly introduced herself as “linked to the party” [giredayî partî], even though
she was not in fact a party member (although an active sympathizer) and told of her
family’s martyrs [şehit] and of the hardships she has had to endure as a Kurdish singer
as a result of repression and bullying by Turkish state authorities. It did not take long
before  Selahattin,  in  turn,  started  praising  himself  for  the  hundreds  of  poems  he
claimed to  have  written  honouring  guerrilla  fighters  and commemorating  martyrs,
recounting rural customs and celebrating Kurdish traditions. As much as Hatice he, too,
clearly had an interest in portraying himself  as an artist committed to the Kurdish
struggle.  In response to Selahattin’s  self-celebratory introduction,  Hatice steadfastly
maintained that politics [siyaset] and culture [çand] should be kept separate, despite the
importance of personal political commitment to the struggle [dava]. What she didn’t
like about politics, Hatice let us know, was that many engage in it merely for their own
self-interest  [çikara  xwe].  Most  people  “do  politics”  [siyaset  dikin]  in  order  to  gain
materially  or  to  practically  benefit  in  other ways,  she  announced.  At  this  point,
however,  she  encountered  opposition  from  her  two  interlocutors:  politics,  they
maintained, was not a business of furthering self-interest, but quite to the contrary, for
a true welatparêz politics was an obligation towards their people; it was both a duty and
an honour. Hatice acquiesced to this standpoint, yet maintained that there were some
people within “the party”17 who only sought to further their own benefits by engaging
in politics. Hatice’s scepticism towards (party) politics did not mean that she thought of
herself  or  her  singing  as  non-political,  however.  Several  times  throughout  the
conversation she emphasized that singing in Kurdish and being a dengbêj in particular
was “itself the biggest politics” [bi xwe siyaseta herî mezin] – a politics that she was of
course devoted to. On this point, Cemal and Selahattin could only agree. 
24 How could Hatice maintain that politics and culture ought to be kept separate, only to
reiterate almost in the same breath that dengbêjî  was itself  a form of politics? The
answer is related, I think, to the construction of dengbêjî as a sphere of prepolitical
cultural essence as I have outlined it above – a construction which allowed Hatice to
simultaneously maintain two romances: one of civil and one of political society, which
effectively worked to reinforce each other. On the one hand, Hatice displayed a vision
of cultural activity as “an apolitical domain of authentic desires and identities, entirely
separate from the messy turf of political society” (Walton 2013: 183). This vision came
to the fore, for example, in her criticism of other dengbêjs for replacing the traditional
lyrics  of  their  kilams with  political  ones  (celebrating  the  guerrilla  struggle  or
commemorating  a  particular  martyr,  for  example)  while  maintaining  the  kilam’s
original  makam,  melody  and  intonation.  She  considered  such  changes  to  be
“disrespectful” [saygısız] towards the original kilam and therefore indicative of a lack of
appreciation  of  the  authenticity  inherent  in  cultural  heritage.  Based  on  the  same
premises Hatice, like many other dengbêjs, would also regularly voice criticism towards
the Kurdish movement’s long neglect of the dengbêjî tradition in favour of explicitly
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political  music  that  had dominated the movement’s  cultural  politics  until  the early
2000s. 
25 Since this vision of dengbêjî as a prepolitical sphere of pristine and authentic cultural
heritage  effectively  worked not  only  to  erect  a  romantic view of  civil  (or  cultural)
society but also to infallibly prove its own premises – that is, the pettiness of its other,
political  engagement – it  simultaneously made for the cultivation of  what one may
want to call the romance of political society. This was a vision of political society as one
in which political activity would be premised on personal, moral commitment and not
on a purely instrumental logic of personal benefit (cf. Kuzmanovic 2012). To elucidate
this logic further, let me refer to the remarks by Mehmed, a Kurdish intellectual, whom
I met at a little Kurdish bookshop in Istanbul. During our conversation about Kurdish
music he showed himself very critical of the politicized nature of much contemporary
Kurdish literature and music.  “They [Kurdish musicians] have learnt that whenever
they make the victory sign [zafer işareti]18 they get applause from the audience. So that’s
what they do, they write political lyrics and include political symbols,” he remarked
cynically. The politicization of Kurdish arts and culture meant that what was actually
important about artistic production in Mehmed’s opinion, namely the artistic content,
was neglected in favour of explicitly political messages, which he regarded as having a
corruptive influence on the former. Yet what Mehmed criticized was not only that arts
and culture as ostensibly autonomous domains had become usurped by politics, leading
to a concomitant neglect of artistic quality, but also that political lyrics and symbols did
not even reflect genuine political commitment on the part of the artists. The problem,
according to him, was that politics sells and that it was used in an instrumental means-
ends  relationship  for  precisely  such  purposes.  What  interlocutors  like  Hatice  and
Mehmed thus rejected was the use of culture as a means for political ends while they
simultaneously upheld that cultural production is inescapably a political matter in the
context of Turkish Kurdistan. 
26 Importantly, the ideal of politics purported here – an ideal that regards politics as a
matter of personal and voluntary, moral commitment – hinges on the liberal idea of a
self-determined  individual  subject  whose  authentic  and  essentially  prepolitical
opinions and desires constitute the source of motivation for entering political society
(Kuzmanovic  2012:  22-26).  But  in  their  romanticized  view of  political  commitment,
Hatice and Mehmed also reflected the contemporary reality of everyday life in Turkish
Kurdistan that has become so thoroughly politicized as a result of Turkish state politics
and  the  Kurdish  movement’s  politics  of  opposition  that  subjects  stand  under  the
constant pressure of having to continually profess and display their political allegiance
in both public and private spheres (cf. Gurbuz 2012). And it is this very logic which
works  to  put  at  risk  the  moral  high  ground of  political  activism promoted  by  the
Kurdish  movement  by  potentially  emptying  political  action  of  sincere,  “interior”
commitment, given that individuals may engage in it simply in response to “exterior”
social pressure (cf. Taylor 1991).
27 It is such mutually reinforcing “romantic” conceptualizations of both civil and political
society, I suggest, that allowed Hatice to simultaneously maintain that dengbêjî ought
to be separate from politics and that it was in fact a form of politics: only by keeping it
separate from a corrupted form of politics that relied on an instrumental means-ends
logic  could dengbêjî  remain truly political  by virtue of  its  nature as  the marker of
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authentic Kurdishness – in turn understood to be an inherently political and indeed
moral condition.
 
IV. Promises of autonomy and gendered spaces of
manoeuvre
28 This leaves one question unanswered,  however.  Why did Hatice cling to a vision of
dengbêjî  as  separate  from politics  –  thereby potentially  reiterating the logic  of  the
state’s  depoliticizing  politics  of  multiculturalism  –  given  that  subscribing  to  the
Kurdish  movement’s  culture-as-politics  model  (like  her  interlocutor  Selahattin  had
done,  for example) could have been in many ways the easier option? What did the
appeal to cultural heritage as a space autonomous from politics afford her and others
that I found to be reasoning in similar ways? 
29 First  of  all,  part  of  Hatice’s  motivation seemed to  lie  in  gaining  a  space  of  agency
outside both the realms of the Kurdish political  movement and that of  the Turkish
state.  Evoking cultural  heritage  as  an autonomous sphere  carried the  promise  of  a
degree  of  independence  from  the  obligations  and  duties  each  side  imposed  on  its
supporters. As much as working for the party was perceived by welatparêz Kurds as a
honourable commitment, it was also clear that it was an onerous one. Not only Hatice,
but many other Kurdish women and men I knew who worked either paid or unpaid for
the party at lower levels such as local assemblies, councils or party-associated cultural
organizations and cooperatives talked (and sometimes complained) about the sacrifices
party  work  demanded:  one  had  to  be  ready  to  conduct  house  visits  in  the
neighbourhood to mobilize supporters until late at night, one was expected to deliver
condolences to martyr families, one was obliged to attend demonstrations in faraway
cities and the like. Many of these activities were moreover risky in the sense that they
could easily lead to legal prosecution. The risk incurred and the sacrifices shouldered
were for many a source of honour accompanied by a sense of patriotic duty, but they
were also  talked about  with anxiety  and often with a  yearning for  a  “normal”  life
outside the rigour which permanent political mobilization demanded. 
30 Moreover, as much as being associated with the party gave individuals and associations
access to financial funds and crucial personal and institutional relations, it also meant
that  other  networks  of  relations  outside  the  political  hegemony  of  the  Kurdish
movement  were  cut  off.  Trying  to  carve  out  a  space  outside  the  logic  of  political
allegiance based on the alleged autonomy of  culture  therefore held the promise of
allowing for a space of action where different relations and new associations might be
possible.19 In practice, however, the sought-for space of action only seldom opened up:
instead of allowing for new relations, trying to steer free of both sides often rather led
to further isolation. In her attempt at keeping her cultural activities out of politics,
Hatice, for example, was confronted with the difficulty of not receiving any kind of
funding – neither from the party, because she refused to formally associate with them,
nor from the state, because she was too politically active and outspoken. As a result, the
attempt at dissociating herself from either political side only highlighted the net of
dependencies Hatice found herself in fact embedded in. The freedom of manoeuvre,
which the autonomy of culture promised, was thus rarely fulfilled: the politicization of
everyday  life  continually  claimed  back  any  autonomous  space  actors  like  Hatice
laboriously sought to carve out. 
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31 Secondly, Hatice’s attempts at invoking the liberal ideal of prepolitical cultural heritage
speaks of  an attempt at  tapping into the legitimating authority  the authenticity  of
culture potentially conferred. This was particularly salient for female dengbêjs, since
many of them were faced with various restrictions concerning singing in public,  or
even just singing outside their own homes in the presence of (male) strangers. For a
number of reasons, which I will not be able to explore in any detail for the sake of
brevity  here,  women’s  voices  are  associated  to  various  degrees  with  the  notion  of
shame [şerm, ayıp].20 This means that especially women dengbêjs of an older generation
have to confront a considerable amount of (sometimes even violent) opposition, mainly
by their male kin, when they seek to sing in spaces where their voices can be overheard
by strangers, let alone the broader public. In this context the discourse of dengbêjî as
representing  the  essence  of  Kurdish  culture  –  paired  with  an  equally  powerful
discourse about Kurdish women’s central role in ensuring the survival of the Kurdish
language as a mother tongue (Çağlayan 2012) – allows women to cast themselves as the
authentic  bearers  of  Kurdish  culture.  Such  a  move,  in  turn,  worked  to  legitimate
women  dengbêjs’  quest  to  sing  in  public  as  it  allowed  connecting  the  practice  of
dengbêjî to the political agenda of the Kurdish movement precisely on the basis of the
culture-as-politics notion I outlined above. Thus, when women dengbêjs told me, for
example, that it was wrong to think of women’s voices as shameful, they would add
that all  they were doing,  after all,  was to recount Kurdish history.  Was this not an
honourable  deed,  which could  only  help  the  Kurdish  cause?  Here,  we  see  how the
transformation  of  a  “living”  oral tradition  into  what  one  might  easily  criticize  as
“dead”  cultural  heritage  can  actually  become  a  dynamic  nexus  of  gendered
engagement. As David Berliner has noted in a different context, “instead of stopping
transmission and culture mechanisms,  heritage recognition creates  aesthetic  forms,




32 In their discussions of different Alevi attempts at attaining legal, political and religious
recognition  in  contemporary  Turkey  both  Jeremy  Walton  and  Kabir  Tambar  have
highlighted  the  ambiguities  and  paradoxes  surrounding  liberal  pluralism  in  this
particular national context. Since in Turkey pluralism constitutes “an incipient rather
than an entrenched mode of governance,” Tambar notes, it may well provide a “critical
perspective  on state  practice” (2010:  653).  Similarly,  Walton has  suggested that  “in
contexts  such as  Turkey,  defined by a  strong state tradition” the nongovernmental
politics called for by liberal-pluralist imaginations of civil society “is not a fait accompli
but  an  achievement”  (Walton  2013:  184) –  an  achievement  which,  he  furthermore
notes, may take on counterhegemonic valence. Applying this insight to the political
landscape of Turkish Kurdistan, I have argued that in this particular context advocating
the practice of dengbêjî as a form of cultural heritage that ought to be separate from
politics similarly constitutes an achievement, given that it goes against the grain of
established modes of governance as they are enacted both by the Turkish state and the
Kurdish political movement. 
33 What nevertheless unites the various actors engaged in current debates about dengbêjî
and  its  status  as  Kurdish  cultural  heritage  –  from  those  who  imagine  dengbêjî  as
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inherently political to those who to the contrary regard it as entirely autonomous from
politics – is a conceptualization of the latter as the essence of an authentic, primordial
identity  that  stands  logically  and  temporally  prior  to  politics.  It  is  this  shared
understanding which makes possible at all recurring debates about the ways in which
dengbêjî ought to relate to politics: whether it ought to provide the legitimizing basis
for political claims or whether it ought to be autonomous from governmental politics.
Today, an increasing number of Kurdish cultural actors not directly aligned with the
Kurdish  political  movement  advocate  the  latter:  like  Hatice  or  Münevver,  their
discourses and practices rely on liberal ideas that posit institutions and practices of
civil society (here, in particular, the world of arts and culture) as distinct from state
power in an idealized way – an idealization Walton aptly calls “the civil society effect.”
Yet, as I have argued, this idealization of civil society does not amount to a departure
from political commitment altogether. Quite to the contrary, it goes hand in hand with
an  idealization  of  oppositional  politics  as  a  sphere  of  personal  and  sincere  moral
commitments  –  an imagination that  in  turn hinges  on liberal  ideas  about  the  self-
willed, authentic individual. 
34 However,  characterizing  the  attempts  by  women  dengbêjs  like  Hatice  at  rendering
dengbêjî autonomous from governmental politics as a counterhegemonic achievement
should not be taken to imply that the kind of project Hatice was engaged in could take
shape outside the purview of state governance. Doing so would in fact only replicate
the civil society effect. Given Turkey’s more recent turn to liberal multiculturalism, the
invocation of cultural heritage as autonomous from politics – even if doing so in the
name  of  commitment  to  an  oppositional  political  struggle  –  inevitably  has  to  risk
becoming complicit in perpetuating the Turkish state’s regime of administering public
(un)speakability. 
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NOTES
1. All personal names used in this article are pseudonyms.
2. Since the time of my research the BDP has established a joint party structure with the HDP
[Halkların Demokrasi Partisi] and its politicians are today running under the name of the latter.
Since the party was still called BDP at the time of my research, I will refer to it as BDP throughout
the article.
3. Kilam is the Kurdish term for the specific genre of sung narratives performed by dengbêjs.
4. In Kurdish, the suffix -î makes an abstract noun out of adjectives and nouns (e.g. qencî means
goodness  from  qenc [good],  or  biratî means  brotherhood  from  bira [brother]).  Dengbêjî  is
accordingly derived from dengbêj and denotes the art or profession of being a dengbêj.
5. Michael L. Chyet (personal communication) argues that the term dengbêj goes back at least
several  centuries.  It  appears  for  example  in  the seventeenth-century romance Mem û  Zîn by
Ehmedê Xanî.
6. This observation has been confirmed to me by other researchers. Fethi Karakeçili (personal
communication) has noted that he found the term dengbêjî to be used primarily by younger
dengbêjs, mainly in order to refer to the practice as a profession and a means to earn money.
Moreover, as Argun Çakır (personal communication) has noted, the grammatical type of noun
formation that creates dengbêjî from dengbêj cannot be observed for Kurmanji terms denoting
musicians other than dengbêjs. For instance, the terms mitirbî from mitirb (a term for Doms, a
Romani people of the Middle East who are often professional musicians), hozanî or hozantî from
hozan (bard  or  minstrel)  or  çîrokbêjî from  çîrokbêj (storyteller)  are  not  –  or  at  least  not  in
widespread – use, even though they are grammatically possible word formations of the same type
as  dengbêjî.  This  seems  to  indicate  that  it  is  specifically  the  figure  of  the  dengbêj whose
knowledge and practice have come to be the object of explicit discourse. 
7. The works by Mehmed Uzun (1991,  2008),  in particular,  have enjoyed immense popularity
amongst both Kurdish and Turkish audiences.  Other works of popular non-fiction writing on
dengbêjs include those by Kızılkaya (2001) and Kevirbirî (2002). In fact, the older works by Yaşar 
Kemal from the 1960s and 1970s, who wrote in Turkish but was of Kurdish origin, already drew
inspiration from and made reference to the epics and ballads of dengbêjs, but did so in a broader
framework of a multivocal Anatolian folk culture, not out of a Kurdish nationalist impetus. See
Çakır (2011). 
8. Most important in this regard is Diyarbakır’s “Dengbêj House” [Mala Dengbêjan], opened in May
2007 as part of an EU-funded project implemented by the Municipality of Diyarbakır (Scalbert-
Yücel 2009). In Van, a similar Dengbêj House was operative for a few years, but had been closed
by the  time I  did  my fieldwork,  for  reasons  I  was  never  exactly  able  to  determine but  that
apparently had to do both with a lack of funding and with disagreements over the degree to
which dengbêjs enrolled at the Dengbêj House ought to represent party politics. The institution
was  reopened  –  again  under  the  auspices  of  the  local  NÇM –  in  early  2014.  While  public
statements about the reopening reiterated a liberal discourse of dengbêjî as a non-political and
purely  cultural  practice  (see  e.g.  http://www.wanhaber.com/mala-dengbejan-yeniden-
acildi-191908h.htm), when talking to the few female dengbêjs enrolled at the institution they
clearly indicated that they conceived of their engagement at the Dengbêj House unambiguously
as a political activity in support of the Kurdish struggle.
9. See for example the works by Parıltı (2006) or Uzun (2008).
10. Serhat is a geographical term that refers to the Kurdish inhabited high-range mountains and
plateaus that lie North of the Diyarbakır plain, including Kurdish-inhabited Western Armenia
and North-Western Iran. 
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11. This  understanding of  cultural  heritage as  constitutive of  (national)  communities  has,  of
course, a long intellectual legacy reaching back at least to Herderian ideas of nationhood, which I
will not be able to spell out here. For a brief overview see Wright (1998).
12. As  Siyah Bant’s  2013 report  on freedom of  expression in  the arts  and censorship in  the
Kurdish region notes,  due to Turkey’s  anti-terror legislation “all  cultural  (e.g.  language)  and
artistic expression within the Kurdish rights struggle can be construed as illegitimate ‘separatist
propaganda’ and hence outside of the protection of freedom of expression and the arts.” The
report as well as an invaluable archive of many other cases of artistic censorship in Turkey is
available at www.siyahbant.org. I would like to thank Banu Karaca for bringing this initiative to
my attention.
13. The term refers to the Treaty of Sèvres concluded in 1920 at the end of World War I, which
envisioned a partitioning of the Ottoman Empire between Armenia, Greece, Britain, France and
Italy.  “Sèvres  Syndrome”  refers  to  the  widespread  belief  in  Turkey  that  outside  forces  are
continually conspiring to weaken, carve up and destroy the Turkish nation, therefore requiring
an unceasing attitude of vigilance and defense against such impending danger. 
14. Consider for example the case of Dengbêj Gazin. She was sentenced to one year in prison for
singing  two Kurdish  songs  in  2010  in  Tatvan that  were  deemed by  the  state  prosecution to
constitute “propaganda for an illegal organization” (i.e. the PKK). She has moreover been tried
for supposedly singing songs “with separatist content” at Newroz celebrations in the same year.
After a series of appeals she was acquitted in both cases in 2013. See https://www.change.org/
petitions/free-raziye-k%C4%B1z%C4%B1l-gazin-kurdish-singer-and-activist and  http://
bianet.org/english/minorities/133332-two-trials-for-singing-kurdish-folk-songs (accessed
19/12/2013).
15. The most famous example of this literal “excommunication” from the realm of the Kurdish
movement is probably the case of the renowned Kurdish singer Şivan Perwer. See Gurbuz (2012).
16. Welatparêz in Kurdish (yurtsever in Turkish) means patriotic. It is used commonly amongst
Kurds to refer to those Kurds who are supporting the armed struggle and the Kurdish movement
in general as opposed to Kurds who support the AKP or the Turkish state. 
17. Depending on context, this expression could refer either to the BDP (today HDP) or to the
Kurdistan  Workers’  Party  (PKK)  and  is  extremely  widespread  in  Turkish  Kurdistan,  bearing
testimony to the ambiguous yet nearly omnipresent nature of the Kurdish political movement as
it manifests itself in people’s lives in a variety of instantiations. 
18. The victory sign indicates support for the Kurdish movement. 
19. One example for what kind of relations might be possible outside the entrenched logic of the
political operative in Turkish Kurdistan by claiming a position of neutrality would be relations
with Turkish feminists  from a liberal  or leftist  background as well  as  relations with cultural
organizations working on a national level with different minority groups. However, attempts at
cooperation between liberal Turkish and radical Kurdish activists carry their own risks and often
harbour  confrontations  regarding  the  Kurdish  armed  struggle  and  a  Turkish  history  of
colonization and systematic injustice and political violence in Kurdistan. 
20. For an anthropological exploration of the dynamics of shame and honour in an Egyptian
Bedouin community, particularly in relation to women’s singing see the work by Lila Abu-Lughod
(1999).
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ABSTRACTS
Over the last decade the art of dengbêjî [Kurdish minstrelsy] has come to be understood as the
paradigmatic form of Kurdish heritage and dengbêjs concomitantly as the authentic carriers of
Kurdish “culture.” This article seeks to outline some of the complexities and paradoxes of this
ongoing process of Kurdish heritage production as it occurs at the intersection of growing liberal
multiculturalist and continuing repressive forms of governance in Turkish Kurdistan. I  argue
that the production of Kurdish cultural heritage as it unfolds on a highly politicized terrain relies
on an understanding of heritage as a marker of collective primordial identity, which goes hand in
hand with an idealization of culture as a sphere of prepolitical pristine authenticity. Moreover,
this article also seeks to shed light on some of the specifically gendered dynamics involved in
contemporary Kurdish heritage making by asking what promises the evocation of dengbêjî as
explicitly distinct from politics may hold for a number of female dengbêjs. 
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